Canonical Snapd any version

Local privilege escalation via snapd socket

Using the TIOCLINUX ioctl request, a malicious snap could inject contents into the input of the controlling terminal which could allow it to cause arbitrary commands to be executed outside of the snap sandbox after the snap exits. Graphical terminal emulators like xterm, gnome-terminal and others are not affected - this can only be exploited when snaps are run on a virtual console.

When generating the systemd service units for the docker snap (and other similar snaps), snapd does not specify Delegate=yes - as a result systemd will move processes from the containers created and managed by these snaps into the cgroup of the main daemon within the snap itself when reloading system units. This may grant additional privileges to a container within the snap that were not originally intended.

snapd could be made to escalate privileges and run programs as administrator

snapd could be made to bypass intended access restrictions through snap content interfaces and layout paths

snapd allows $HOME/bin symlink

The snapctl component within snapd allows a confined snap to interact with the snapd daemon to take certain privileged actions on behalf of the snap. It was found that snapctl did not properly parse command-line arguments, allowing an unprivileged user to trigger an authorised action on behalf of the snap that would normally require administrator privileges to perform. This could possibly allow an unprivileged user to perform a denial of service or similar.

snapd could be made to escalate privileges and run programs as administrator

Race condition in snap-confine's must_mkdir_and_open_with_perms()

Snapd seccomp filter TIOCSTI ioctl bypass

snap-confine in snapd before 2.38 incorrectly set the ownership of a snap application to the uid and gid of the first calling user. Consequently, that user had unintended access to a private /tmp directory.

snap-confine as included in snapd before 2.39 did not guard against symlink races when performing the chdir() to the current working directory of the calling user, aka a "cwd restore permission bypass."

snapd will follow archived symlinks when unpacking a filesystem

local snapd exploit through cloud-init

snapd non-regular file indefinite blocking read

snapd created ~/snap with too-wide permissions