Cisco Aironet 1810

A vulnerability in the web-based GUI of Cisco Mobility Express 1800 Series Access Points could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication. The attacker could be granted full administrator privileges. The vulnerability is due to improper implementation of authentication for accessing certain web pages using the GUI interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to the web interface of the affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass authentication and perform unauthorized configuration changes or issue control commands to the affected device. This vulnerability affects Cisco Mobility Express 1800 Series Access Points running a software version prior to 8.2.110.0. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCuy68219.

Cisco Aironet Access Points Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco Aironet Access Points Ethernet Wired Clients Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco Aironet Access Points WLAN Control Protocol Packet Buffer Leak Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco Access Point Software Command Injection Vulnerability

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

Cisco Access Point Software Denial of Service Vulnerability

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.