Cisco IP Phone 8832 Firmware any version

Cisco IP Phone 6800, 7800, 7900, and 8800 Series Web UI Vulnerabilities

Cisco IP Phone 6800, 7800, 7900, and 8800 Series Web UI Vulnerabilities

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series Phones could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access certain parts of the web interface that would normally require authentication.

Cisco IP Phone 6800, 7800, and 8800 Series with Multiplatform Firmware Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability

Cisco Desk Phone 9800 Series, IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series, and Video Phone 8875 with SIP Firmware Denial of Service Vulnerability

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

Cisco Desk Phone 9800 Series, IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series, and Video Phone 8875 with SIP Firmware Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phone 6800, 7800, and 8800 Series with Multiplatform Firmware Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.