Cisco IP Phone 8861 Firmware

Cisco IP Phones Web Server Remote Code Execution and Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phone 6800, 7800, 7900, and 8800 Series Web UI Vulnerabilities

Cisco IP Phone 6800, 7800, 7900, and 8800 Series Web UI Vulnerabilities

Cisco IP Phone Remote Code Execution and Denial of Service Vulnerability

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series Phones could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to access certain parts of the web interface that would normally require authentication.

Cisco IP Phone 6800, 7800, and 8800 Series with Multiplatform Firmware Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phone TCP Packet Flood Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phone 7800 Series and 8800 Series Session Initiation Protocol XML Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series Session Initiation Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco Desk Phone 9800 Series, IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series, and Video Phone 8875 with SIP Firmware Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco Desk Phone 9800 Series, IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series, and Video Phone 8875 with SIP Firmware Information Disclosure Vulnerability

The TrustZone implementation in certain Broadcom MediaxChange firmware could allow an unauthenticated, physically proximate attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution in the TrustZone Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) of an affected device. This, for example, affects certain Cisco IP Phone and Wireless IP Phone products before 2021-07-07. Exploitation is possible only when the attacker can disassemble the device in order to control the voltage/current for chip pins.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The Wi-Fi implementation does not verify the Message Integrity Check (authenticity) of fragmented TKIP frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject and possibly decrypt packets in WPA or WPA2 networks that support the TKIP data-confidentiality protocol.

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

Cisco IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series Cisco Discovery Protocol and Link Layer Discovery Protocol Denial of Service Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phones Cisco Discovery Protocol and Link Layer Discovery Protocol Remote Code Execution and Denial of Service Vulnerabilities

Cisco Desk Phone 9800 Series, IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series, and Video Phone 8875 with SIP Firmware Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phone Software Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phone 6800, 7800, and 8800 Series with Multiplatform Firmware Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

Cisco IP Phone 7800, 8800, and 9800 Series Information Disclosure Vulnerability

Cisco Desk Phone 9800 Series, IP Phone 7800 and 8800 Series, and Video Phone 8875 with SIP Firmware Information Arbitrary File Write Vulnerability

Cisco IP Phones Information Disclosure Vulnerability

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.