OISF Suricata any version

Suricata before 5.0.8 and 6.x before 6.0.4 allows TCP evasion via a client with a crafted TCP/IP stack that can send a certain sequence of segments.

In Suricata before 6.0.13, an adversary who controls an external source of Lua rules may be able to execute Lua code. This is addressed in 6.0.13 by disabling Lua unless allow-rules is true in the security lua configuration section.

Suricata datasets: stack overflow when saving a set

An issue was discovered in Suricata 5.0.0. It is possible to bypass/evade any tcp based signature by overlapping a TCP segment with a fake FIN packet. The fake FIN packet is injected just before the PUSH ACK packet we want to bypass. The PUSH ACK packet (containing the data) will be ignored by Suricata because it overlaps the FIN packet (the sequence and ack number are identical in the two packets). The client will ignore the fake FIN packet because the ACK flag is not set. Both linux and windows clients are ignoring the injected packet.

Suricata http2: protocol-change type confusion can lead to denial of service

Suricata detect/alert: heap-use-after-free on alert queue expansion

Suricata http: heap use after free with http.request_header and http.response_header keywords

Suricata before 5.0.7 and 6.x before 6.0.3 has a "critical evasion."

An issue was discovered in Suricata before 6.0.4. It is possible to bypass/evade any HTTP-based signature by faking an RST TCP packet with random TCP options of the md5header from the client side. After the three-way handshake, it's possible to inject an RST ACK with a random TCP md5header option. Then, the client can send an HTTP GET request with a forbidden URL. The server will ignore the RST ACK and send the response HTTP packet for the client's request. These packets will not trigger a Suricata reject action.

ikev2: unbounded client transform storage can lead to resource exhaustion

Open Information Security Foundation Suricata prior to version 4.1.3 is affected by: Denial of Service - TCP/HTTP detection bypass. The impact is: An attacker can evade a signature detection with a specialy formed sequence of network packets. The component is: detect.c (https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3625/commits/d8634daf74c882356659addb65fb142b738a186b). The attack vector is: An attacker can trigger the vulnerability by a specifically crafted network TCP session. The fixed version is: 4.1.3.

A buffer over-read issue was discovered in Suricata 4.1.x before 4.1.4. If the input of the decode-mpls.c function DecodeMPLS is composed only of a packet of source address and destination address plus the correct type field and the right number for shim, an attacker can manipulate the control flow, such that the condition to leave the loop is true. After leaving the loop, the network packet has a length of 2 bytes. There is no validation of this length. Later on, the code tries to read at an empty position, leading to a crash.

Suricata http2: oom from duplicate headers

crafted traffic can cause denial of service

In Suricata before 6.0.13 (when there is an adversary who controls an external source of rules), a dataset filename, that comes from a rule, may trigger absolute or relative directory traversal, and lead to write access to a local filesystem. This is addressed in 6.0.13 by requiring allow-absolute-filenames and allow-write (in the datasets rules configuration section) if an installation requires traversal/writing in this situation.

Suricata segfault on StreamingBufferSlideToOffsetWithRegions

Suricata 's http2 parser contains an improper compressed header handling can lead to resource starvation

Suricata's pgsql: memory exhaustion use on record parsing

Suricata http/range: NULL-ptr deref when http.memcap is reached

Suricata modbus: txs without responses are never freed

Suricata http1: quadratic Content-Disposition processing can lead to denial of service

Suricata ldap: unbounded responses per transaction can lead to resource exhaustion

Suricata oversized resource names utilizing DNS name compression can lead to resource starvation

Suricata allows stack overflow in transforms

Suricata defrag: IP ID reuse can lead to policy bypass

Suricata dnp3: unbounded reassembly can lead to resource exhaustion

Suricata nfs: unbounded stateful structures can lead to resource exhaustion

Suricata ja4: invalid alpn leads to panic

Suricata uses excessive resource use in malformed ssh traffic parsing

Suricata dnp3: unbounded transaction growth

Suricata http1: infinite recursion in decompression

Suricata DCERPC: unbounded fragment buffering leads to memory exhaustion

Suricata generic detection bypass using TCP urgent support

Suricata detect/datasets: reachable assertion with unimplemented rule option

Suricata lua: excessive flow variable registration can bypass sandbox

Suricata's mishandling of data on HTTP2 stream 0 can lead to resource starvation

Suricata dcerpc: quadratic complexity in dcerpc buffering

Suricata http2: unbounded resource consumption

Suricata smtp/mine: quadratic complexity in extracting urls

Suricata stream: quadratic complexity in stream inspection