Pebble Templates Pebble

Pebble Templates 3.1.5 allows attackers to bypass a protection mechanism and implement arbitrary code execution with springbok. NOTE: the vendor disputes this because input to the Pebble templating engine is intended to include arbitrary Java code, and thus either the input should not arrive from an untrusted source, or else the application using the engine should apply restrictions to the input. The engine is not responsible for validating the input.

Pebble Templates 3.1.2 allows attackers to bypass a protection mechanism (intended to block access to instances of java.lang.Class) because getClass is accessible via the public static java.lang.Class java.lang.Class.forName(java.lang.Module,java.lang.String) signature.

Versions of the package io.pebbletemplates:pebble from 0 and before 4.1.0 are vulnerable to External Control of File Name or Path via the include tag. A high privileged attacker can access sensitive local files by crafting malicious notification templates that leverage this tag to include files like /etc/passwd or /proc/1/environ. Workaround This vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling the include macro in Pebble Templates: java new PebbleEngine.Builder() .registerExtensionCustomizer(new DisallowExtensionCustomizerBuilder() .disallowedTokenParserTags(List.of("include")) .build()) .build();