HCC-Embedded NicheStack any version

An issue was discovered in HCC Embedded InterNiche NicheStack through 4.3. The tfshnd():tftpsrv.c TFTP packet processing function doesn't ensure that a filename is adequately '\0' terminated; therefore, a subsequent call to strlen for the filename might read out of bounds of the protocol packet buffer (if no '\0' byte exists within a reasonable range).

The web server in InterNiche NicheStack through 4.0.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and networking outage) via an unexpected valid HTTP request such as OPTIONS. This occurs because the HTTP request handler enters a miscoded wbs_loop() debugger hook.

An issue was discovered in tcp_rcv() in nptcp.c in HCC embedded InterNiche 4.0.1. The TCP header processing code doesn't sanitize the value of the IP total length field (header length + data length). With a crafted IP packet, an integer overflow occurs whenever the value of the IP data length is calculated by subtracting the length of the header from the total length of the IP packet.

An issue was discovered in HCC embedded InterNiche 4.0.1. A potential heap buffer overflow exists in the code that parses the HTTP POST request, due to an incorrect signed integer comparison. This vulnerability requires the attacker to send a malformed HTTP packet with a negative Content-Length, which bypasses the size checks and results in a large heap overflow in the wbs_multidata buffer copy.

An issue was discovered in tcp_pulloutofband() in tcp_in.c in HCC embedded InterNiche 4.0.1. The TCP out-of-band urgent-data processing function invokes a panic function if the pointer to the end of the out-of-band data points outside of the TCP segment's data. If the panic function hadn't a trap invocation removed, it will enter an infinite loop and therefore cause DoS (continuous loop or a device reset).

An issue was discovered in HCC embedded InterNiche 4.0.1. This vulnerability allows the attacker to predict a DNS query's source port in order to send forged DNS response packets that will be accepted as valid answers to the DNS client's requests (without sniffing the specific request). Data is predictable because it is based on the time of day, and has too few bits.