SOOIL AnyDana-A Firmware

In SOOIL Developments Co., Ltd Diabecare RS, AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A, the communication protocol of the insulin pump and its AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A mobile applications use deterministic keys, which allows unauthenticated, physically proximate attackers to brute-force the keys via Bluetooth Low Energy.

In SOOIL Developments Co., Ltd Diabecare RS, AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A, a hard-coded physician PIN in the physician menu of the insulin pump allows attackers with physical access to change insulin therapy settings.

In SOOIL Developments Co., Ltd Diabecare RS, AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A, a client-side control vulnerability in the insulin pump and its AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A mobile applications allows physically proximate attackers to bypass user authentication checks via Bluetooth Low Energy.

In SOOIL Developments Co., Ltd Diabecare RS, AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A, a client-side control vulnerability in the insulin pump and its AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A mobile applications allows physically proximate attackers to bypass checks for default PINs via Bluetooth Low Energy.

SOOIL Developments Co Ltd DiabecareRS,AnyDana-i & AnyDana-A, the communication protocol of the insulin pump and its AnyDana-i & AnyDana-A mobile apps doesn't use adequate measures to authenticate the communicating entities before exchanging keys, which allows unauthenticated, physically proximate attackers to eavesdrop the authentication sequence via Bluetooth Low Energy.

In SOOIL Developments Co., Ltd Diabecare RS, AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A, the communication protocol of the insulin pump and its AnyDana-i and AnyDana-A mobile applications lacks replay protection measures, which allows unauthenticated, physically proximate attackers to replay communication sequences via Bluetooth Low Energy.

SOOIL Developments CoLtd DiabecareRS, AnyDana-i, AnyDana-A, The communication protocol of the insulin pump and AnyDana-i,AnyDana-A mobile apps doesn't use adequate measures to authenticate the pump before exchanging keys, which allows unauthenticated, physically proximate attackers to eavesdrop the keys and spoof the pump via BLE.

SOOIL Developments CoLtd DiabecareRS, AnyDana-i ,AnyDana-A, communication protocol of the insulin pump & AnyDana-i,AnyDana-A mobile apps doesnt use adequate measures to protect encryption keys in transit which allows unauthenticated physically proximate attacker to sniff keys via (BLE).